

The Morals of Responsibility, Social Justice and Social Security of the Person



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The main values of a society in any concrete historical period of its existence are reflected in its morals. These morals can be considered as the recognition by society of the fact that life, well-being and the social security of a person can only be guaranteed if society is united as a whole, and if the whole society unites to observe the values provided.

The moral requirements imposed on individuals and social systems (groups, institutions, establishments etc.) can be imposed in a variety of different forms: as social norms of behaviour, moral values, values of orientation, or mechanisms of self-control. The universal characteristic of morals means that it penetrates every aspect of human life.

Other characteristics of morals are out-institutionalization and imperativeness. The first means that morals are outside the sphere of organized human activity. In other words, nobody created morality, but rather it was developed spontaneously as a result of the long-term everyday behaviour of people, which over time gradually made its character imperative i.e. morals started not to concern the purposefulness of actions, but moral duty, which directly orders people to operate for the sake of goodness itself. Moreover, during the history of societies different factors have influenced our understanding of goodness at different times. These factors include the type of material production of goods, the character of social stratification, state legal regulations, the means of mass-communication and the quality of pre-existing moral practice.

The dominant type of social action has had a particular influence on the formation of morals. Social action is aimed both at satisfying the needs, requirements and interests of the individual, while at the same time being directly or indirectly aware of other people. And when actions concern the interests of other people it necessarily causes a response from them. This is micro-social interaction, a complex of interactions which create the base for a multi-level social reality.

The next level of social organization, meso-social interaction, is formed by complex interactions between subsystems of a society (family, labour collectives, public organizations), which aim to mutually satisfy the needs and interests of their members.

The third, and highest, level of social reality, macro-social interaction, is formed by complex interactions between separate local communities inside the meta-society of mankind.

The first attempt to classify different types of social action was undertaken by Max Weber. However, it should be noted, neither his classification of types of social action (traditional, value-rational, goal-instrumental and affectional), nor any of the following classifications (for example, the classification of social actions by Jürgen Habermas (1995)) provided an answer to the question of the social importance of human actions during the formation of moral practice.

At the same time, the acts of people can be divided into different types:

1. rational and irrational (rational social action differs because the actor has had preliminary thought as to the purpose of the act, and also adequate means of achieving the act);
2. initiated and induced (in an initiated social action, the actor rationally and voluntarily selects the means and ways of action);

- responsible and irresponsible (responsible action is initiated social action in which the actor takes responsibility for the possible negative consequences of the action in relation to other people, the social environment or the natural environment) (see more: Aydinian, Shipunova, 2001)

It is necessary to note that in real life there are not only “ideal types” of social action, but also, very frequently, mixed types of social action. However, only responsible action transforms the person into a truly civilized, social entity: the person realizes that having the freedom to initiate social actions without taking responsibility can lead to “thoughtless, pretentious voluntarism”. In this situation, there is an inseparable unity of reason (knowledge) and morals where “rational” means at the same time “moral”.

For convenience of classification, the types of social action can be represented in the following diagram:




Diagram 1: Classification of types of social action

The development of types of social action in history has followed the following path: from irrational action to rational; from rational to initiated (free) and, finally, from initiated to responsible action. These stages therefore pass through the following blocks on the diagram: 1,2,3,5. However, reality never develops in a linear fashion, so in history the blocks 4 and 6 also appeared.

In line with the development of social action, certain types of morals also developed. The dominant moral at any given time was dependent on the type of social action that prevailed at that time. Therefore, in history it is possible to transparently trace the development of types of morals (from morals of duty – morals of responsibility) in parallel and simultaneously with the development of types of social action: block 2 (on the diagram) corresponds to moral duty; block 3 to the morals of free belief; and block 5 to the morals of responsibility.

Each of the named types of morals has 2 versions:

Morals of duty: 1) morals of duty to a society (or a community, or collective), characterized by attitudes of collective consciousness, when public interest has importance over and above the personal; 2) morals of duty to God in which a moral life is lived in correspondence to the divine instructions of God, guaranteeing finding salvation.

Morals of free belief: 1) the morals of individuals based on individualist consciousness, when personal interests are higher than public interests; 2) the morals of “the imposter”, when the key principle is based on the idea of “the means justifies the end”.

Morals of responsibility: 1) the morals of responsibility to “yours”, when people correlate their interests to the interests of their class, their country, their nation, etc; 2) the morals of responsibility to all mankind (global ethics).

All these types of morals coexist in any society at any stage of its development. In Ancient China, Taoists were the carriers of the highest form of morals, and as a result they assumed the moral responsibility for all mankind. Furthermore, great representatives of Ancient Greece such as Socrates, Diogenes of Sinope, Zeno of Citium, Theophrastus, and the all Cyrenaics considered themselves cosmopolitans who were responsible for the destiny of the world. However, at each stage in the development of society, one kind of morals was dominant. The morals of duty prevailed in European history until the modern age, when the morals of free belief began to become more extensive before finally becoming dominant at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th Centuries. Simultaneously, the strong position of moral responsibility to “yours” could also be observed. Global ethics began to become widespread in the second part of the 20th Century, which we can find in the programs and activities of international organizations such as the United Nations, OSCE etc, and also in social movements like those for the preservation of the environment or global peace. To speak of global ethics which absolutely dominate the world is not yet possible, but a recognition of the necessity to have them has already been realized: in 1993, “the declaration of global ethnos” was accepted at a session of the Parliament for World Religion in Chicago.

Many researchers see the further development of society in connection to the development of morals of responsibility, which are based on differential ethics that “start from the difference of subjects who enter moral relations, their uniqueness and indispensability; supplement the classical ethics which are based on “the golden rule” of the unity of moral subjects.” (Projective Philosophic Dictionary, 2003, 482).

All of the above means that, in the modern world it’s necessary to define moral law “from the absolute singularity, and indispensability of each moral subject” (Ibid, 483). This requirement provides the basis for differential ethics and dictates its key rules: “Act so that your greatest capabilities serve the greatest requirements of others”; “Do what others require of you and what nobody else could do instead of you”. It is clear that recognizing the rights or interests of others, comprehending these rights and interests, and having the ability to act in accordance to this comprehension, can only occur when a person has responsibility for their own free will (see more: Shipunova, 2005).

The question of freedom of the will is directly connected with a consideration of the problem of the correlation between “necessity and chance”, and has been discussed by numerous philosophers. A number of them concluded that in every moment of his or her life a person is a passive instrument in the hands of necessity. Others, albeit with some qualification, recognized the presence of personal freedom “even if only in some questions” (Spinoza), or as voluntary and reasonable following moral prescription (Kant). Other philosophers again believed that “there is no determinism, the person is free, the person is freedom” (Sartre, 1953, 13). In all honesty, Sartre, being an existentialist, considered freedom as deeply tragic in essence and closely related to death. His famous quote “the Person is sentenced to freedom” means that in spite of the fact that the person is free to choose, he has to choose, and thus his choice in any case is determined by what is imposed on the person by a society.

An explanation of this fact is, in the opinion of some authors, that “the world of European rationalism is a mechanism, which in principle is alien to freedom, and is both callous and impersonal, opposing the person who in life has to submit to the action of the general laws of the mechanism.” (Tulchinsky, 1996, 115). Rational calculating behavior and actions transform freedom into the necessity to operate according to imposed goals in order to achieve the benefits of civilized society. The definition of freedom as a “cognizing necessity” is widespread in philosophical literature, but such a representation completely destroys freedom: necessity, whether it is cognized or not, is still necessity. Thus, if there is no freedom, there

can also be no freedom of will. However, in this understanding, there is still the recognition that a person has some element of freedom, for example, freedom to choose goals, and/or the means of achieving these goals. And such a recognition is valuable and coincides with the definition of freedom provided by the ideology of liberalism, which forms the base of modern democracy.

In the ideology of liberalism (see more: *About Freedom...*, 1995), developed at different times by a number of famous philosophers including Voltaire, Humboldt, Diderot, Constant de Rebecque, Locke, Mill, Montesquieu, Spencer, Marx and Engels (in his early works), “freedom” is the central concept and all agreed that it should be understood as an opportunity of a choice: goals, means of achieving goals, actions, etc. If there are no opportunities; there is no freedom. Furthermore, non-recognition of freedom of choice means “the destruction of ethical systems, morality, and law.” (Tulchinsky, 2002, 78). Different people actualize this opportunity in different ways. Rational beings do this by taking into account cognized necessity, while less rational beings don’t, so for this reason they make more mistakes in their choice of action and suffer as a result. Consequently, freedom can be seen as the destiny for rational beings. Hence, it’s necessary to illuminate what should be understood by the term rationality.

Rationality in Western civilization (to which Russia is more and more inclined) means rationality which coincides with the idea of efficiency, as conformity of chosen goals and needs. However, “the result of absolute rationalism is immoralism; negative aspects of scientific and technical progress which feed misologia... and totalitarianism”, which leads to “the extremity of abstract rationalism accompanied by imposter-ism and the petty tyranny of reason and violence.” (Ibid, 70-71)

As it is impossible to steal a person’s freewill, so it is impossible to take his or her moral responsibility. In the modern civilized world, a person does not take responsibility for his or her actions only “by virtue of a lack of intellectual or moral development, or by virtue of illness” (*Perspectives of Metaphysics...*, 2000, 321). However, even in these instances, the responsibility is still not eliminated. The responsibility takes an “external” form of punishment such as legal laws, loss of relations, disorders in life, disrespect from the community, etc.

Responsibility as the ethical (moral) characteristic of an individual means the correspondence of a person’s moral actions to his or her duty in the context of his or her capabilities. The concept of duty means that a person acts freely, voluntarily and in accordance with their consciousness, and can establish the borders of his or her actions. The main criterion for defining these borders is the rights and freedoms of other individuals because “in the world there is nothing more sacred than the rights of other people- they are untouchable and cannot be infringed” (Kant, 1988, 306). Certainly, the account and observance of the rights of other people requires a person to restrict his or herself.

The development of rationalism and freedom are conditions in the formation of moral responsibility. Here, a divergence from the concept of traditional rationalism can be observed which “denies the irrational – conscience, sin, repentance, shame- and thus from responsibility and imputability”. (Tulchinsky, 1996, 166).

Today, rationality is understood as harmony with the world; self-reflection; a spiritual acceptance of guilt; conscience; honour; merits; personal freedom. The last element is emphasized by a number of researchers. As, Friedrich Hayek writes: “Freedom to establish our own behavior in a sphere where the choice is imposed by material circumstances, and the responsibility for building your own life according to conscience, are the only spheres in which moral feelings can develop, and moral values are replicated every day by free will.” (Ibid, 155) The wider the borders of people’s independent actions, the more humane and free a society becomes. On the other hand, a person can establish the “line” of his or her behavior and take responsibility for this. “All the above, should not be understood as a contradiction of

the internal and external – the true dialectic is not so crude. It is possible to view them as a “continuous loop”, in which both factors, the “internal” and the “external”, are inseparably connected. The duty passes through the heart and enters the world through the honour and dignity of the person.” (Perspectives of Metaphysics..., 2000, 317) Certainly dignity is not moral, but this is the condition without which moral behavior cannot exist. As Vladimir Bibler fairly notes, “on the scale of the values of a moral person, the self-preservation of dignity (... there is nobody above me, there is nobody below me...) is incomparably more essential and more real than any of the benefits of position- be it social, job, material, prestige – and it is even more essential than even personal safety or the preservation of life. It can be seen that when human dignity is offended and humiliated, there is already no individual who is capable of living in the horizon of the person, or in other words, capable of living freely and morally.” (Bibler , 1988, 376). The summation of the multitude of responsible acts finally provides the formation of the moral of responsibility in society.

Each type of moral of responsibility provides the basis for certain ideologies: the morals of responsibility to “yours” corresponds to the ideology of nationalism, which leads to different forms of separatism or isolationism; the morals of responsibility to all mankind corresponds to the ideology of a democratic society without limits or the ideology of cosmopolitanism. A mankind which doesn't want to be plunged into self-destruction has no other way to realize the existence of cultural universals which enable the provision of survival and the perfection of mankind.

The central concept of any type of morals, including the morals of responsibility which provide the regulatory functions, is the concept of “social justice”. To some researchers this concept is seen as indefinable, unreflectable, and having no reference in social being and therefore is only an ideal value, a dream and an unobtainable absolute. On the one hand, when we consider social justice as the core concept, we create reference points for how society has to be constructed; how people have to treat each other; what type morals have to exist to provide solidarity between people; what government rules there have to be, etc. These references represent an ideal view of reality, an unattainable goal which carries out the function of the humanization of society. On the other hand, the concept of “social justice” is not developed, is unclear, and full of internal contradictions, which create conditions for the manipulation of the concept in different circumstances: election campaigns, justifications of totalitarian ideology, the establishment of penal legal systems, persecution of different marginal groups, etc.

The distinctive characteristic of the European humanistic view of justice is identifying with law and order. According to European consciousness, living fairly means to live under the law established by the state. Thinkers were unable to ignore the value of personality because of the distribution of humanistic ideas, and they saw that observance of rules, protection of freedom and love of the motherland as that which provided happiness to people and constituted the true glory of sovereigns. Justice here is both a legal, and an ethical category. It represents not only the reasonable organization of a society, fair laws, and rights, but also the internal features and aspirations of people who live in a united living space and who have to coordinate their interests and aspirations of freedom with the interests and aspirations of other people. Kant wrote: “Justice is the right that doesn't give any powers to force another ... Coram foro interno is the justice of strict law, but not coram foro externo. Justice, thus, is the right in which grounds of external imputability of law coram foro externo are not so significant, but where they are most significant for personal conscience.” (Kant, 1988, 322) Humanistic ideas, which support the aspirations of people to have a happy life and to have freedom, give birth to democracy and liberalism. The formula of justice in democratic relationships therefore constantly needed to be specified. This is why the search for an adequate answer to the question of social justice has been constantly sought by human science. Basically, the concept of social justice is involved in two major themes: social

differentiation and the social state. In the first case, the question centres on the stratification of society; the problems connected to unequal social opportunities; social inequality (in terms of income, power, knowledge, prestige); and social mobility. A theoretical discussion of the question is based on, primarily, the theories of Marx and Weber. From this base, sociologists emphasise an understanding of social justice as equality (of opportunities, chances, material conditions, etc). But this identification leads researchers to a separation from reality, or to pessimism or skepticism, as history has shown that the realization of justice as equality between all people is actually impossible.

In terms of social state, the idea of a social or welfare state is a logical continuation of the idea of the legal system as a device which forms a government system based on laws. "The State turns into the arbitrator in a society, it becomes a tool which is used to represent the interests of all groups and layers of society. The law in turn becomes the major instrument of achieving consensus, order and stability based on compromise i.e. various groups and layers of the population make mutual concessions in order to realize their own interests. In this way, the state has a legal form, and a social and democratic essence." (Social Management., 2000, 17)

"The point of view that the real value of the social state lays not in redistribution, but in the potential for social-integration, has become more and more widespread" (Ibid, 39) and therefore is one of the most important points in of examining social justice as social state. Social integration is considered as the processes and results of state activity in terms of protecting the social rights of citizens in different areas of public life, when these social rights are provided by the development of social policy. The cultural dimension of social policy is that it promotes social inclusion and through this overcomes injustice, and thus, strengthens the legitimacy of society. The political dimension of social policy is connected to the relief of friction between classes and the transformation of contradicting interests into productive forms of conflict resolution. The economic dimension of social policy improves the formation of human resources, protects workers, promotes a willingness to work and, thus, promotes increased labour efficiency.

The social dimension of social policy provides the social conditions for wellbeing, i.e. they stabilize the sphere of private life, within which human resources are reproduced (or regenerated). (Kaufman, 2002, 513)

The actual embodiment of social policy in society is the level of social security given to individuals and their level of personal well-being. Social security is insurance against risks (political, economic, ecological, criminal, etc) and the granting to all citizens equal rights in terms of opportunities in the labour market, and the state protection of disabled and socially vulnerable members of society. Social security implies development and the introduction of some state guarantees.

Social security sets preconditions for the well-being of the person in society, however, it cannot be considered in itself as an absolute guarantee. The fact of the matter is that social security is not simply the presence of a system of protection of the person, but one that functions effectively, which allows the provision of a certain quality of life and well-being. The well-being of a person can be defined as the satisfaction of the person in terms of social conditions (political, economic, ecological, spiritual, moral, etc) and the quality of his or her life in any given society and at any given moment in its development. Thus the valuable (maybe even the most valuable) aspect is the psychological well-being of the person, which takes into account not only the individual's system of coordinates, but also the degree to which a person can positively direct their function in society, and the degree to which they are able to realize that direction, which is subjectively expressed by each person through feelings of satisfaction with himself or herself, or his or her own life.

It is necessary to state that not all researchers share the opinion of the high integrative potential of the social state. Evidence of this view can be provided by the inability of social states to solve the problems of unemployment and the misdistribution of labour resources

through migration in meta-societies. Based on this, these researchers give the following unfavourable forecast: “The most likely long-term forecast is the gradual growth of a social product which is produced by a reduced number of groups in the population, a fact which demands either a high level of redistribution of incomes in favour of the unemployed, or a decrease in the standards of their support.” (Kaufman, 2002, 504-505) The inequalities in incomes, authorities, prestige etc., caused by social stratification will amplify and, hence, in a society social injustice will grow. A further argument to support the view that the social state doesn't have high integrative potential is provided by the fact that modern states limit personal freedom and continually increase their control. So, Kaufman writes “The process of developing the welfare state is to be understood necessarily as not simply the limitation of personal freedom by means of government enforcement, but as an opportunity for simultaneous strengthening of state intervention and the ability for public self-regulation.” (Ibid, 513) However, this kind of reasoning does not deny the integrative nature of the social state. It merely emphasizes the difficulties of its embodiment in real life, in societies which are transforming.

A detailed analysis of concept of social justice can be found in the works of Karl Popper and John Rawls. Popper in his work “The Open Society and its Enemies” (1946) defines the concept of justice in liberal democratic public relationships as “the majority of us, especially who are humanists, when speaking about justice mean the following: a) the equal distribution of civic duties, i.e. those restrictions of freedom that are necessary in public life; b) the equality of citizens under the law with the proviso that c) laws are not biased for the benefit of or against separate citizens, groups or classes; d) a fair judicial system; and e) the equal distribution of benefits (not only duties) that can mean for people membership in the given state.”(Gelikh, 2003, 123).

Rawls gives another definition. He argues that the principles of justice, which apply to the basic structure of fundamental social institutions, are objects of the social contract, in which he isolates two aspects of justice:

1. justice as the ideal construct of society;
2. the realistic situation in society, in which there exists injustice that the society gets on with somehow. But how is it possible to get on with injustice? The answer could be “the idea of an overlapping consensus”, which includes two principles of justice: a) Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties, where the scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value; b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.

The idea of an overlapping consensus demands a constant reassessment of justice, a search for its new forms and formulations (for example, by the implementation of “force measures”) (Rawls, 1995, 19-29)

A significant point in the reasoning of both authors is that the phenomenon of social justice is directly connected to the prevailing values in a society. Here values are understood, on the one hand, to be “something that matters because it desirable for the person in the future, and is more preferable than other opportunities ... Mostly personal values live in the person's experiences and his or her social actions.” (Luckmann, 1998, 56) On the other hand, values are something useful and, hence, functional for the preservation and development of a society. To generalize the above, it is possible to say the following: Social justice, as the ideal value, is an absolutized representation of what the world and society have to be in order to provide “liberty, equality, brotherhood”, and to ensure the observance of all people's rights in a society

or on the whole Earth (according to Aristotle this is “general” justice, while Rawls calls these values “the theory of strict consent”). This ideal representation of social justice sets the desirable ideal reference points to which a society (at least a democratic one) and individuals constantly aspire. Such an understanding of justice can be found in the works of Plato, humanists in the Age of Enlightenment, utopian socialists, and also in works of some sociologists studying the questions of social differentiation and social inequality. However, it could be said that there is another approach to studying the phenomenon of social justice, namely: the attempt to operationalize the concept of social justice i.e. to concretize this ideal universal and eternal value (for this Aristotle uses the concept ‘political’ justice while Rawls calls this representation of social justice “the theory of the partial consent”). The concretization occurs by providing a description of the volume of the concept ‘social justice’, i.e. by providing a list of what is considered fair in the given society at the present time (for example, human rights, freedom, equality before the law etc.) Such a concrete definition is completely necessary, as it allows researchers to move to an analysis of actual social practices. However, not only is it necessary to describe the volume of the concept of ‘social justice’, but also to find out the content of the concept of ‘social justice’. In other words, in order to analyse how the principles of social justice are actually realized in social practice, it is necessary to move from a consideration of social justice as the ideal value, to a consideration of it as the operational or tool value in which not only are desirable reference points specified, but also means of their achievement. Such a tool concept can be the following: Social justice is a measure of public benefit (social adequacy) laws and other regulatory prescriptions (formal and informal) that establish and support, on the basis of the agreement, the order and activity in both people’s and organization’s lives, which in turn promotes the survival and development of socium, and also provides integration and dignified human existence for members of society. (see more: Shipunova, 2005) Institutes, politics, norms and laws are socially fair when, on the basis of the agreement between subjects of social interactions, they create and support bases of a worthy life for the people in society. Here the principle of “just deserts” is proclaimed, i.e. there is an aspiration for everyone to provide individual justice in his/her particular relationship with the state and social institutes.

In the ‘tool’ definition of social justice, the foreseeable reference points (or the purposes) are fixed – “an establishment of the order and activity in both people’s and organization’s lives that promotes the survival and development of socium; provides integration and dignified human existence to members of society” and also the means of their achievement – “a measure of utility, i.e. social adequacy of social norms”. Here the expression “dignified human existence” is a generalization of all those benefits which are proclaimed as those in modern society: a measure of freedom, equality, an educational level, social security, inclusion in social networks, choices of legal types of activity, personal well-being etc. Above it was already remarked that the modern understanding of social justice emphasizes the agreement between different sides of social interactions, which provides integration to members of socium, the process by which solidarity is created, and, finally, the social order. The agreement’s “output” is that any decision can be finalized as a regulatory prescription (formal or informal norm). The official (formalized) prescriptions can be considered as methods and influences (permissions, interdictions, obligations), mechanisms and subjects of their realization, and an establishment of legal relationships, of law enforcement and acts of the right realization. The basic attributes of the legal enforceability of the agreement (official norms) are: a consistent complex of laws on different questions or their set; subordinate legislation establishing the order of management by systems and subsystems, called upon to solve the certain problems; a normative regulation of activity of separate establishments and professional categories; the legal acts providing protection of rights of citizens; the certain level of legal consciousness of the population and experts. This legal enforceability specifies, details, and differentiates the initial agreement and the mechanisms of its realization. Each

moment of specification is connected to the development of new regulatory prescriptions, thus the initial agreement in the form of the official norm (it can be called “general”) “gathers” the whole complex of norms (“serving” norms). Both “general” and “serving” norms can be socially-adequate or socially-inadequate. Social adequacy is displayed not only in an objective state of affairs in society (solving of problems, reduction of crime and deviance rates, well-being of social subsystems and citizens, their optimum performance), but also in the positive public image of these norms. Attributes of the moral agreement (informal norms) can be: the expressed interval of norms (or “field of opportunities”) that allow the support of a certain level of tolerance in society towards different diversities; the positive public attitudes to a problem, an activity, the agreement itself, and the mechanisms of its realization; a low level of norm breaking.

“General” and “serving” norms are socially-inadequate objectively or only in the consciousness of the majority when at the social level they cause negative social phenomena (anomie; destabilization; conflict between authorities and social groups; unequal opportunities etc.), and, at the individual level, they are perceived to be unfair or limit freedom. The inevitable result is different ways of breaking norms (crime, delinquency, offences etc.), which reflects both a disaccommodation of interests and a disagreement with politics. Thus, the criteria for the level of justice/injustice and social adequacy/inadequacy of the system of regulatory prescriptions are: the level of norm breaking (official and unofficial); widening/narrowing of “field of opportunities” for legal activity; the level of tolerance; protests in the form of strikes or other forms of expression of disagreement; citizens’ subjective feeling of justice/injustice; the level of trust of official social institutes; positive, indifferent or negative relationships with governmental politics; political apathy; conflicts between social groups; social exclusion of some social groups etc.

These phenomena are the manifestations of citizens’ feeling of injustice. This feeling appears when people are constantly faced with socially-inadequate norms in social interactions, which interferes with their well-being and participation in social life. Another source of feeling injustice is being faced with an absence of socially-adequate norms that usually work to integrate people into social space, and hence, make their lives more productive i.e. allow them to satisfy their needs most effectively (with smaller expenses and qualitatively). Personal needs can be divided, as is known, into basic needs (physiological, safety) and social needs (needs in the social environment, the giving and receiving of respect, feeling self-confident, opportunities for self-actualization). Social needs can also refer to the need for freedom, which should be understood as the opportunity to choose activities, acts, lifestyles, goals, means etc. in legitimate social space. (As Sigmund Freud has truly noted, “what is seen to be the aspiration for freedom in human community can be the protest against any existing injustice, and thus what can become favorable for the further development of the civilization.” (Freud, 1996, 216).

Manifested protest reactions are a consequence of the disturbance of social justice, however, social justice inherently includes also justice in regard to the person, understood as a measure of “just deserts” (as an ideal) of the citizens’ equality of rights. Taking into account this, some researchers consider the fact of the presence of the legislation on human rights as an indication of a measurement of social justice (Trotskovskaya, 1999). It is necessary to say that just the presence of legislation on human rights alone is insufficient. It is also necessary to consider all sets of enforceable laws on human rights as a blessing and an incontestable display of justice in modern society.

Observance of human rights is not the unique criterion of an estimation of justice in society. Here we can also refer to such parameters as the level and quality of life, and also the development of human potential. These parameters are in a stage of discussion and development that does not cancel their utility and prospectivity for measuring the level of social justice.

In order to maintain a certain level of social justice, modern societies include in the arsenal two strategies: an establishment of social justice through an elaboration of socially-adequate norms, and a restoration of downtrodden justice in regard to citizens, social groups and subsystems, as even at the ideal organization of society (that basically is impossible) norms will continue to be broken.

Certainly, all modern democratic societies are aimed at an establishment of social justice (as it is understood in the given society). Ideas of the social state and their embodiment in life testify to this fact (it's a different matter that they do not always turn out to be reasonable and effective). In addition to measures to establish social justice, there are steps in its support or restoration. In political life, trade unions, public organizations and movements protecting the interests and rights of separate groups of citizens operate in this field. In legal life, there are public controls on the activity of courts, prosecutor's offices, penitentiary organizations; decriminalization of some kinds of crimes; expansion of using alternative punishments; restorative justice etc. The expansion of social investments by business is evidence in the economic sphere. In Russia recently the model of social partnership has also been recognized. "In this model the organization and the public enter into equal partners in a mutual relation of "interpenetrating systems." (Weksler, Tulchinsky, 2002, 23) The model is based on the search for mutual understanding, an establishment of cooperation, maintenance of contacts. In the social sphere, social welfare institutes, whose mission it is to increase the level of integration and solidarity of members of society, serve to restore social justice. From all the above it becomes clear that morals, social security, and personal well-being are closely connected. An effective, socially adequate system of social security based on the 'tool' understanding of social justice should create conditions for dignified human existence, and the well-being of the person, which, in turn, can provide the development of morals of responsibility which promote the strengthening of social justice in society.

(Translated from Russian to English by Anna Smirnova and Michelle Cornick)

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